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Introduction
There is increasing recognition that smallholder commer-
cialisation and integration of smallholders into high-value 
agro-food systems offer sustainable pathways for poverty 
reduction, food security, employment, women’s empow-
erment, conservation and climate change in the develop-
ing economies (FAO, 2016).  Kenya, like other developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, is experiencing growing 
supermarket penetration, fast urbanisation and rising per 
capita income resulting into changing consumer preferences 
(Trienekens, 2011). This trend has created emerging market 
opportunities for smallholders (World Bank, 2016). However, 
despite the growing market opportunities, many smallholders 
continue to encounter considerable barriers to accessing these 
markets (Poulton et al., 2012; Okello et al., 2011). 
Many studies on firm participation decisions are based 
on Williamson’s (1985) work on institutional economics and 
organisational theory, and are mainly concerned with estab-
lishing the link between transaction cost (TC) and channel 
choice. Transaction cost theory presupposes that a farmer’s 
decision to participate in particular markets is based on 
comparative institutional efficiency: that is to say, the TC 
minimising condition (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016). 
However, access to high value markets is more than a ques-
tion of mere fulfilment of production volume requirements 
and minimizing TC; it is more about how farmers embed 
themselves into the networks of value chain lead actors 
(Kilelu et al., 2017).
For instance, supermarkets offer better opportunities but 
impose stringent quality and safety requirements, making 
it costly for smallholders to participate (Rao et al., 2012). 
The high margin segments of traditional markets, however, 
are dominated by opportunistic brokers and middlemen with 
exclusionary tendencies that drive smallholders out of par-
ticipating in the market. Besides, the domestic traditional 
food value chains are characterised by poorly developed 
information channels, low productivity, lack of storage facil-
ities, high transaction costs and limited value-adding activi-
ties (Barret, 2010). 
This study investigated how value chain governance 
influences smallholder participation in the emerging mar-
kets for African indigenous vegetables and its implication 
on food security in Kenya. In this study, value chain gov-
ernance (VCG) is construed as the framework and power 
relation dynamics among agents governing business transac-
tions and the way these transactions are organised (Gereffi 
and Fernandez-Stark, 2016). Understanding the governance 
structure of the value chain would be important in that it 
would provide information on the constraints and opportu-
nities involved in drawing up food systems policy-related 
recommendations for Kenya. Extant scholarship proposes 
VCG mechanisms such as a relational or contractual form, 
or a combination of both, to improve value chain integra-
tion (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016). In this study, the 
relational mechanism is conceptualised so as to describe the 
level of trust between value chain agents that causes repeat 
transactions. The contractual mechanism is meanwhile con-
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ceptualised so as to describe the degree to which contracts 
minimise uncertainties when establishing exchange transac-
tions between actors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, given 
the renaissance of the African indigenous vegetables (AIVs) 
in Kenya, we give a brief overview of traditional vegetable 
production systems in the study areas. In the subsequent sec-
tions, we briefly discuss value chain governance, linking it 
to understanding inclusive value chain upgrading for small-
holders. We then describe the methods, the study area and 
techniques of data analysis.  This is followed by a presen-
tation of the study findings with a highlight of value chain 
mapping, opportunities and constraints following a SWOT 
analysis and upgrading strategies. Finally, we conclude by 
outlining the associated agribusiness investment implica-
tions and recommendations.
African Indigenous Vegetables in 
Kenya
African indigenous vegetables (AIVs) are vegetable 
crops whose natural habitat originated in Africa (Maundu et 
al., 1999). In Kenya, there are more than 210 species that 
are important in traditional diets (Mwaura et al., 2014). 
However, many of them have often been ignored in favour 
of exotic vegetables such as kales and cabbages (Muriithi 
and Matz, 2015). The most popular AIVs include both wild 
and cultivated leafy greens such as slender leaf (Crotalaria 
brevidens), African kale (Brassica carinata), African egg-
plant (Solanum aethiopicum), pumpkin leaves (Cucurbita 
pepo.), amaranth (Amaranthus spp.), nightshade (Solanum 
spp.), spider plant (Cleome gynandra), cowpea (Vigna 
unguiculata), and jute mallow (Corchorus olitorius) (Abu-
kutsa, 2010). They are more popular with smallholder farm-
ers because they require fewer inputs and are better adapted 
to local agro-ecological conditions (Ekesa et al., 2009). 
The AIVs present a niche market for smallholders in 
the emerging lucrative value chains in Kenya. They are 
predominantly produced by smallholders in rural and peri-
urban areas but many consumers in urban areas access them 
through traditional and supermarket channels (Gido et al., 
2017). Consumer preference literature argues that although 
these vegetables may be consumed in small quantities by 
many households, they are more affordable and improve 
household dietary diversity by influencing the intake of 
cereal staples, manage hunger and play a central role in 
household food security (Mayekiso et al., 2017). Besides 
their importance to household diets, they can also be impor-
tant in addressing micronutrient deficiencies because they 
are rich in micro-nutrients such as vitamins A and C as well 
as calcium, zinc, and iron (Abukutsa, 2010) and possess 
bioactive compounds with antioxidant potential (Kamga 
et al., 2013). Therefore, improved production, distribution, 
marketing and consumption of indigenous vegetables could 
help mitigate food insecurity and alleviate malnutrition in 
developing countries like Kenya.
The above benefits have led to concerted promotional 
campaigns by development agencies, research institutions 
and government agencies as a strategic crop for addressing 
households’ income, food and nutrition in Kenya (Irungu et 
al., 2007). Presently, the demand for AIVs in the domestic 
market is growing and remains unmet (Ngugi et al., 2007). 
However, despite the potential to improve household food 
and nutritional security, empirical evidence on smallholder 
participation in AIV markets and food security still remains 
poor, missing, mixed and inconsistent (Mayekiso et al., 
2017). There is anecdotal evidence so far of possible posi-
tive income, employment and technology adoption, and mar-
ket demand (Olabode et al., 2017; Weinberger and Msuya, 
2004), plus differentials in urban and peri-urban production 
and marketing (Oluoch et al., 2009; Ambrose-Oji, 2009), but 
these largely emanate from analysis of incomplete sections 
of value chain segments or else focusing on peri-urban areas 
and supermarket chains (Mwaura et al., 2014). The global 
market literature emphasises that access to such emerging 
markets depends on more than just production efficiency, so 
farmers must gain entry or upgrade into the buyer networks 
that form these markets (Kilelu et al., 2017). Linking agri-
food value chains to food and nutrition security in the face 
of transformations in food systems would be important in 
informing policies and designing strategies for better small-
holder integration in the emerging high margin segments of 
the AIVs value chains in Kenya. 
There is a lack of information on the power relations 
between various actors along AIV value chain right from 
seed production and distribution, production processes, pro-
duce marketing up to the consumption point. Extant stud-
ies do not explain the exclusion of smallholders under the 
prevailing value chain governance and the upgrading oppor-
tunities available for AIV farmers. Moreover, conclusions 
from many of such studies are derived from econometric 
analyses that may not adequately account for exclusionary 
effects induced by power relations, trust, coordination and 
other social dynamics. This situation gives a strong impetus 
to the identification of actors and their activities and socio-
economic elements influencing inclusive participation and 
upgrading in the in the AIV value chains. A holistic inquiry 
capturing the entire value chain governance for AIVs and its 
effects on food security and sustainable livelihoods is needed 
to inform decisions concerning effective upgrading strate-
gies potentially available for improving value chain partici-
pation for small producers (Kilelu et al., 2017).
Governance in Agro-food Value 
Chains
Value chain governance is defined as “authority and 
power relationships that determine how financial, material, 
and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain” 
(Gereffi, 1994). Governance defines the structure of rela-
tionships and coordination mechanisms that exist between 
transacting partners across time and space of a given value 
chain (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). It refers to the inter-firm rela-
tionships and institutional mechanisms through which non-
market coordination of activities, the setting and enforce-
ment of product and process parameters to be met by actors 
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in the chain take place (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). More 
often than not, buyers play an important role in setting and 
enforcing private standards and rules of engagement with the 
producers because of the (perceived) risk of producer failure. 
These parameters are also set and enforced by government 
and international agencies concerned with quality stand-
ards or labour and environmental standards (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2001). 
Extant literature has referred to governance structures 
variously as distribution styles, channel types and vertical 
coordination. Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) distinguish 
three possible types of governance: network, quasi-hierarchy 
and hierarchy. However, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) 
build on this work to point out a continuum-like transactional 
power dynamics between lead firms, subordinate firms and 
suppliers ranging from spot market to hierarchy. In the spot 
market, goods are exchanged between multiple buyers and 
sellers at the current time period with price as the main deter-
minant of the final transaction. The other end of the chain 
continuum is the vertical integration, which refers to a situ-
ation where products move between various stages of pro-
duction, processing and distribution as a result of within the 
firm managerial orders rather than at the direction of prices 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016). 
In between the two polar forms are the intermediate types 
of governance structures like modular, relational and cap-
tive. However, value chains are not static and change their 
organisation, governance, and linkages with changes in 
markets and competition (Pietrobelli and Staritz, 2013). The 
governance structure changes as the industry evolves and 
matures and governance patterns within an industry can vary 
from one stage or level of the chain to another. Firms and 
actors sometimes operate in multiple and interacting govern-
ance structures and these affect opportunities and challenges 
for economic and social upgrading (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). 
They observe that the degree of power of the buyer over the 
supplier decreases as value chains move from hierarchy to 
market. Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) contends that 
the variables that determine governance structures include: 
the complexity of information and knowledge transfer 
required to sustain a particular transaction; the extent to 
which this information knowledge can be codified and, 
therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-
specific investment between the parties to the transaction and 
the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to 
the requirements of the transaction. 
An extensive body of literature on smallholder participa-
tion on higher value agro-food markets focuses on Global 
Value Chains (GVCs) (Trienekens, 2011; Gereffi and Lee, 
2012; Minten et al., 2009). These studies robustly explain 
the vertical coordination by dominant lead firms from devel-
oped economies and resource-constrained producers from 
developing countries and the impact of such value chains 
on income and development. Despite these efforts, if we 
adopt the perspective of Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013), GVC 
in the context of the AIV value chain has not been explored; 
hence, this study is highly relevant as it aims to investigate 
the implications of value chain governance mechanisms on 
smallholder participation in AIV emerging markets and food 
security in Kenya.
Materials and Methods
A multistage sampling procedure was employed to select 
regions, smallholders and other actors for the study. In the 
first stage, four counties of Nairobi, Kiambu, Kisii, and Kaka-
mega were purposively selected for the study. The choice of 
the four counties was based on their known differentials in 
factors that are crucial to market participation by smallholder 
AIV farmers. In particular, they provided an opportunity to 
assess differentials in market participation between rural and 
peri-urban farmers as well as a chance to contrast procure-
ment arrangements between supermarkets and traditional 
wet market traders. For instance, Kisii and Kakamega are 
rural counties where there is a significant volume of produc-
tion and marketing by smallholders. Kiambu is a peri-urban 
area where farmers have significant interactions with whole-
sale, supermarkets and urban retail traders. Nairobi city was 
selected because it is the largest urban market with highly 
differentiated market outlets, including supermarket outlets, 
to provide cases for coordinated value chains. 
In the second stage, two sub-counties with a high concen-
tration of farmers and farmer groups involved in production 
and marketing of AIVs were purposively selected from each 
county. In the third stage, purposive sampling was used to 
strategically select information-rich farmer groups and  key 
informants that would assist the study with in-depth under-
standing of actor relations and upgrading opportunities in the 
AIV value chains. 
Data was obtained through focus group discussions and 
individual in-depth interviews using semi-structured discus-
sion guides. Discussion topics orbited around governance 
themes such as private safety and quality standards, mar-
ket information flow, price setting, repeat transactions and 
contractual arrangements. In each sub-county, two focus 
group discussions (FGD) were carried out with purposively 
selected participants of between eight and twelve farmers 
per session. Care was taken to ensure that selected farmers 
had certain commonality and heterogeneous characteris-
tics and similar levels of understanding of a topic. Besides, 
deliberate attempts were made to attain a fair mix of par-
ticipants based on gender, age, socioeconomic background 
and education level. In addition, 25 in-depth interviews 
were conducted with key informants drawn from super-
market managers, government offices, value chain consult-
ants and managers with NGOs involved in promoting AIV 
value chains. 
Discussions were further held with 99 traders including 
middlemen, transporters, retail traders and wholesalers. Sep-
arate discussion guides were prepared for different actors. 
Discussions and in-depth interviews entailed examination 
of patterns and explanatory factors, first at each node of the 
chain, and, secondly, through exploration of the nature and 
range of the relationships between actors at different nodes 
in the chain. Emphasis was given to governance dimensions 
such as coordination of value creation activities, contractual 
arrangements, access to information, market competition, 
price determination, private rules and standards, trusts and 
uncertainties. Researchers also made observations of the 
actors’ interactions and business practices such as price 
negotiations, units of measure, product quality, the presence 
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of storage facilities and condition of the general environment 
and value addition among others.
Qualitative data was first transcribed and thematic analy-
sis was performed as devised by Mertens (2010) and Braun 
and Clarke (2006). Value chain map was developed using 
functional analysis. The core processes, actors involved, 
flow and quantity of product at each node of the value chain 
were determined. A flow chart was used to represent the 
activities in the value chain.
Results and Discussion
Mapping of the AIV Value Chains 
Mapping of key activities of the whole economy is the 
first step in conducting the chain analysis and this process 
explores input-output structure as well as territoriality of 
the value chain. Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) assert 
that mapping assists in identifying important nodes, how 
the distribution of rewards takes place through social rela-
tions and a range of interconnected economic activities. This 
study dealt with four dimensions: types of value chains; core 
processes (segments); actors involved and their functions 
as well as the existing types of relationships and linkages. 
Caution should be taken that this study only provides a snap-
shot of the value chain structure and does not adequately 
represent all factors that influence the conduct of individual 
value chain participants. For instance, this study did not look 
into consumer (end market) requirements and opportunities. 
Two value chains represented by traditional and coordinated 
value chains co-exist side by side as shown in Figures 1 and 
2. Parameters such as contractual arrangements, retail prac-
tices, and private food safety and quality standard require-
ments to delineate traditional value chain from coordinated 
value chains. The traditional value chains were defined by 
traditional market sourcing where producers and traders had 
no prior arrangements on production, quantities delivered 
or payment arrangements. Coordinated value chains, on 
the other hand, featured modern procurement arrangements 
where farmer activities were aligned based on contracts with 
supermarket which specified quantities, vegetable qualities, 
delivery timing and prices (Bijman et al., 2011).
Key actors and their functions in AIV value chains
The study categorized actors into those from peri-urban 
areas and rural regions. Generally, the segments and actors 
were similar for rural and peri-urban regions (Figure 1). 
Actors included input suppliers (agro-vets), farmers and 
farmer groups, middlemen, wholesalers, retail traders and 
supermarkets. Marketing segments had the largest and most 
complex network of primary actors. For example, farmer 
groups, middlemen, wholesalers, brokers and retailers all 
converged at this node. The ensuing section provides detailed 
account of the functions of various actors.
Input Suppliers
Input suppliers fell in four categories: agro-vets, NGOs, 
local seed retail traders and farmers preparing their own seeds. 
The major inputs for indigenous vegetables included seeds, 
fertilizers, water and labour. In the rural areas, retail traders 
were supplied seeds by farmers regenerating from own farms. 
Some NGOs also provided farmers with certified AIVs seeds 
Consumers:
Households, restaurants, hotels, colleges,  Hospitals, Schools
traditional value chain
Consumption
Marketing
Local market 
retailers
Urban retailers Small
enterprises
Supermarket
chains
Middlemen
Rural smallholders
(Individual households) Peri-urban smallholders
Coordinated value
chainFarmer
groups
Wholesalers
Input suppliers 
(local seeds)
Input suppliers 
(improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides)
Assembling and 
distribution
Production
Input supply
A. Market channels for rural smallholders B. Market channels for per-urban smallholders
Figure 1: Value chain map for AIVs.
Source: Own composition
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as part of input credit packages. In the peri-urban areas, agro-
vets sold certified seeds, chemicals, farm equipment and also 
provided technical support to farmers. There were no con-
tractual arrangements between input suppliers and farmers, 
indicating weak backward vertical linkages. These findings 
concurred with earlier works of Mmasa and Msuya (2012) 
who found that input suppliers for sweet potatoes in Tanzania 
were not vertically integrated with producers and that input 
suppliers played the least role in the value chains. 
Farmers and farmer groups
The study established that farmers grew many types of 
indigenous vegetable crops. However, the scope of this study 
was limited to establishing the extent of production and mar-
keting of five key vegetables, namely: African nightshades 
(Solanum spp.), leafy amaranth (Amaranthus spp.), spider 
plant (Cleome gynandra), cowpeas (Vigna unguiculata) 
and Ethiopian kale (Brassica carinata). Farmer activities 
and practices included seed preparations, land preparation, 
nursery preparation, planting and sowing, weeding, irrigat-
ing, applying fertilizer, harvesting or selling their vegetables 
before harvest. There were differences in practices for rural 
and peri-urban farmers. For example, in the peri-urban areas, 
many farmers prepared nurseries where vegetable seedlings 
were transferred to the main plots. On the other hand, farm-
ers from the rural areas mainly practised direct seeding. In 
the peri-urban areas, farmers planted indigenous vegetables 
as monocrops, while in the rural areas, vegetables were 
intercropped mostly with maize. In the rural areas, farmers 
planted between three and five types of vegetables, while in 
peri-urban areas, the majority of farmers grew averagely two 
to three types of vegetables.  
The study also established that many farmers in peri-
urban areas while only a few farmers in the rural areas 
irrigated their vegetable farms during dry seasons. Farm-
ers made production decisions independently and were not 
influenced by group activities or contractual engagement 
with any buyer. All input costs and production risks were 
solely borne by the individual farmer. 
All farmers sampled for this study belonged to farmer 
associations. There were two different organizational forms 
of farmer groups: the specialized ‘farmer marketing groups’ 
and the general-purpose ‘farmer associations’. General-pur-
pose ‘farmer associations’ were most common in rural areas. 
Their functions included organizing production technology 
demonstrations, member training and in some cases and 
member-to-member extension services. They provided plat-
forms for collaboration with support service providers such 
as NGOs and government extension programs. Specialised 
farmer marketing groups were mainly found in peri-urban 
areas. In addition to functions undertaken by the general-
purpose farmer associations, the specialized ones organised 
joint transportation of vegetables to the markets. In some 
instances, these groups were collective action marketing 
groups, which lobbied and negotiated with the wholesale 
market authorities for designated trading space and lower 
market access fees. For the farmer groups that were supply-
ing supermarkets, they were involved in grading, bunching 
and negotiating contracts for their members.
Middlemen
In the rural areas, farmers loosely referred to middlemen 
as ‘brokers’. Middlemen were the first link between produc-
ers and other downstream actors. There were two categories 
of middlemen: individual small-scale traders without formal 
registration or trade licensing and small to medium formal 
businesses. The small-scale traders assembled vegetables 
directly from rural farmers and sold to retailers at the local 
markets or wholesalers in urban markets. Those selling to 
wholesalers carried out additional functions such as sorting, 
aerating and re-packing vegetables. Middlemen from Kisii 
region were exclusively trading in AIVs throughout the year. 
This implies that indigenous vegetable trade was their major 
source of livelihood.
The second category of middlemen specialized in sup-
plying supermarket outlets and other institutional consum-
ers such as hotels, education institutions and hospitals. They 
bought vegetables from diverse sources ranging from farm-
ers, middlemen, wholesalers and retail traders. Their func-
tions included assembling vegetables, cleaning, trimming, 
sorting, re-bunching before they transported to buyers. They 
were mostly preferred by supermarkets as first choice sup-
pliers of AIVs due to their financial capacities and ability to 
supply assorted vegetables within short notices. 
In general, there were no contractual arrangements 
between middlemen and farmers. One unexpected finding 
of this study was that during off-peak seasons, some mid-
dlemen made pre-harvest payment arrangements with the 
farmers and harvested vegetables by themselves. Similar 
pre-harvest arrangements have also been found in Chile 
between medium and large-scale horticultural producers and 
their buyers (McCullough et al., 2008). 
Wholesalers
Wholesale markets were located either in the peri-urban 
areas (Wangige) or within Nairobi city (Wakulima, Gikomba, 
and Kangemi). Wholesalers bought vegetables from middle-
men in the rural areas or farmers from the peri-urban areas 
and then sell to retail traders. Their functions include assem-
bling vegetables from different middlemen, repackaging 
the vegetables from the rural suppliers and selling to retail-
ers. They are responsible for assessing market demands set 
prices and communicate their decisions to middlemen and 
retailers. Wholesalers are well networked with trusted mid-
dlemen from different parts of the country. 
Retail traders
Retailers were the final links of downstream actors that 
delivered vegetables to final consumers. They bought veg-
etables from diverse actors such as farmers, middlemen and 
wholesalers. Retailers traded in relatively low quantities 
and were trading a whole range of vegetables and were not 
specialized in individual vegetables. There were two broad 
categories of retailers: traditional and modern retailers. This 
categorization was based on differences in their contractual 
arrangements with suppliers, quality and quantity require-
ment, capital investments and retailing practices. 
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Figure 2: Chain segments of traditional AIV value chains.
Source: Own composition
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Actors
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Functions
• Crop management
Actors
• Supermarkets
 Functions
• Price setting
• Cooking
Figure 3: Chain segments of coordinated AIV Value chains.
Source: Own composition
Traditional retailers were mainly found in traditional 
market channels. They carried out their businesses in diverse 
locations such as alongside wholesalers within municipal 
wholesale markets, in wet markets, temporary estate stalls, 
and kiosks, by roadsides and in public bus parks. No busi-
ness licensing was required for retail trading except for 
daily market fee charged by municipal market authorities. 
Their functions included buying vegetables, transportation, 
re-bunching, cleaning, displaying and selling to consumers. 
The study observed that some retailers within urban residen-
tial areas were hawking vegetables, while others were sell-
ing vegetables that were pre-washed, chopped, and packed. 
Most retail traders were women confirming earlier assertions 
by Maundu et al. (1999), who indicated that 95% of indig-
enous vegetable traders in Nairobi were women. Retailers 
sold more than one type of indigenous vegetable alongside 
other exotic vegetables.
Modern retailing of fresh fruits and vegetables in super-
markets is a new phenomenon in Kenya like other develop-
ing economies (Macharia et al., 2013). Supermarket procure-
ment system and retailing of AIVs typifies the coordinated 
value chains (Figure 2). Their functions included advertising 
and selling vegetables. It was also observed that some super-
markets sell cooked AIVs in addition to fresh vegetables. 
The study established that supermarkets only bought veg-
etables from some formal farmer groups. However, super-
markets preferred dealing with a few prequalified middle-
men because they were able to meet quantity and consistency 
requirements. This finding is consistent with the observation 
of Hichaambwa and Tschirley (2006) about supermarkets in 
Zambia, which also preferred engaging farmer groups and a 
few intermediaries to reduce transaction costs. The results 
further agree with the findings of Bidogeza et al. (2016), 
whose study on the indigenous vegetables value chains in 
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Table 1: Summary of actors and functions in the AIV value chains.
Segment Actors Function Activities Traditional value chains
Coordinated 
value chains Linkages
Input  
Supply
Agrovets Input suppliers -	 Sell certified seeds, chemicals and 
provide technical assistance to 
farmers
   -  + +  + Seed companies, 
farmers
Local seed traders Supply seeds -	 Sell local seeds   +  +   -  + Farmers 
NGOs Input Supply -	 Provide input credit in the form of 
certified seeds, chemicals and light 
equipment
  +  +    -  - Farmers, Agrovets 
and extension service 
providers
Farmers Local seed  
production
-	 Prepare seeds from own harvests
-	 Sell local seeds traders in local 
markets
  +  +   -  + Neighboring farmers, 
seed traders in local 
markets
Production 
Farmers Produce AIVs -	 General crop management  +  +  +  +  NGOs, Ministry of 
Agriculture,
Farmer Associ-
ations
Farmer  
mobilization
-	 Mobilize members for trainings  +  + +  +  NGOs, Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
NGOs Facilitators -	 Technical assistance to farmers +  +   +  +  Farmers, MOA
-	 Input credit   -  + -  -  
Ministry of  
Agriculture
Coordination of 
extension services
-	 Technical assistance to farmers 
through extension services
 +  +  +  +  Farmers, NGOs
-	 Input subsidies -  -  -  -  
Assembly  
and 
Distributions
Farmer groups Aggregating 
vegetables   
-	 Organize transportation to wholesale 
markets
-	 Supply vegetables to supermarkets 
-  + +  +   Farmers, transporters 
Middlemen Buying vegetables -	 Packaging for transportation +  +   -  + Farmers, transporters
Transporters Transportation -	 Delivering vegetables to the markets  -  +  +  + Middlemen,  
wholesalers
Wholesaling 
Farmer groups Secure market 
space 
-	 Pay markets fee for members  -  -  +  + Market management, 
famers
Famers Selling vegetables -	 Sell vegetables to wholesalers or 
retailers
-  -   +  + Wholesalers, urban 
retailers
Wholesale traders Selling to retailers -	 Setting price for middlemen and 
retailers
+  +  -  + Middlemen, retailers, 
market management
Retailing 
Retail traders Selling to  
consumers 
-	 Bunching of vegetables 
-	 Cutting vegetables
+  +  -  -  Wholesalers,  
middlemen, market 
management, brokers
Intermediaries Sell to  
supermarkets
-	 Clean, sort and re-bunch Wholesalers, farmers, 
supermarket
Supermarkets Selling to  
consumers
-	 Cold storage, pack and display
-	 Cook vegetables
-  -  +  + Farmer groups,  
intermediaries, banks
Note: Actors presence = -- not present, -+ partly present, ++present 
Source: Own composition
Cameroon found that major nodal points in the traditional 
value chain consisted of input supply, production, harvest-
ing, marketing and consumption.
Table 1 summarizes the actors and functions in the AIV 
chains.
The chain governance structure
In this study, “chain governance” encompasses the sys-
tems of coordination, regulation and control within and 
between value chain segments through which value is gener-
ated. Various scholarly works have proffered different forms 
of chain governance models. Governance models as iden-
tified by Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016), are market, 
modular, relational, captive and hierarchy, were employed to 
explain AIV power relations. The findings on parameters of 
value chain governance are presented below.
Horizontal coordination
As has been highlighted earlier, many farmers and mar-
ket traders had formal and informal relationships with actors 
in similar positions or other nodal points in the value chains. 
The coordination examined at the production level was to 
establish whether farmers align their production and market-
ing activities to some collective decisions by their groups. 
Many farmers in the rural areas considered their associations 
to be helpful in enabling them to acquire new production 
skills and attracting collaboration with NGOs and govern-
ment extension agencies. Farmer groups provided platforms 
through which development agencies carried out farmer 
capacity building activities. All groups had formal or infor-
mal group constitutions and executive office bearers con-
sisting of a chairperson, secretary and treasurer who were 
entrusted with mobilizing members for group activities. No 
Otieno Benard Abel, Cristopher Obel Gor, Samwel Ongwen Okuro, Paul Abuto Omanga and Wolfgang Bokelmann
48
farmer group was involved in collective actions towards 
joint procurement of inputs or marketing in the rural areas. 
However, farmer groups in peri-urban areas engaged in 
collective actions especially through joint transportation of 
vegetables to wholesale markets and supermarkets. A farmer 
group in Kabete sub-county negotiated with Wangige market 
authorities for reduced market access fees and a designated 
space within the market, where farmers directly engaged in 
wholesaling. However, farmers were not procuring inputs 
collectively except for the shared water resources for irriga-
tion. Farmers also sold vegetables individually and not as 
a group. Therefore, collective action was limited to costs 
sharing on transportation and market access fees. The case 
for farmer groups contracted with supermarkets was slightly 
different. Such farmer groups were required to be formally 
registered, operate bank accounts and have group constitu-
tions. Group members shared transportation costs and losses 
proportionately.
At the assembly and distribution level, middlemen from 
rural areas had informal welfare associations based in the 
local markets. They were mainly rotational savings and credit 
associations (ROACAS). Middlemen were represented in 
the market management committees which enabled them to 
negotiate and secured lower market access fees. The associa-
tions were not involved in collective actions such as joint 
transportation that would help them minimise transaction 
costs. Middlemen transporting vegetables to Nairobi were 
merely using same transporters but each trader met their 
costs separately. Association members relied on each other’s 
knowledge about a prospective wholesaler before one could 
engage them. Middlemen never competed with each other 
over wholesaler customers. Middlemen colluded in setting 
daily producer prices. The associations were also cartels for 
preventing farmers and new suppliers gaining entry into the 
business. Middlemen supplying institutional consumers and 
supermarkets were not organised into associations. 
At the marketing (wholesaling and retailing level), trader 
associations operated cartel-like informal business associa-
tion making it difficult for new entrants into the business. 
Wholesalers, on their part justified the cartel tendencies as 
mechanisms for maintaining price stability.  Traditional retail 
traders were not organised, and entry into the retail business 
was free.  This could be attributed to their large numbers and 
the diversity of their operation locations. 
Vertical coordination
The traditional value chains were dominated by arm’s 
length spot market chain governance with no vertical coor-
dination between smallholders and buyers. In the case of 
coordinated value chains, supermarkets had loose and inter-
mittent informal agreements with some farmer groups in 
Kiambu region, thereby exhibiting weak vertical coordina-
tion. Unlike in the Global Value Chains, the contracts in the 
AIV value chains in Kenya were informal in nature and less 
binding to both parties. For instance, supermarkets were not 
obliged to offer any technical or financial support to farm-
ers, while farmers were not compelled to supply every order 
placed by the supermarkets. 
Private food safety and quality standards
Vegetable quality was an important element in transac-
tion negotiations between farmers and buyers. However, 
traders used quality arguments to suppress prices offered to 
farmers especially when the vegetables appeared to be of 
low quality. In the coordinated value chains, the supermar-
kets set private rules and standards. Supermarkets in Kenya 
do not have production process certification schemes such 
as GLOBALGAP quality protocols in horticultural exporters 
markets. Nevertheless, there were common basic codes of 
practice and quality standards adopted by the supermarkets. 
The vegetable quality requirements were based on the physi-
cal attributes similar to the traditional value chains except 
the standards were higher. Supermarkets did not offer pre-
mium prices for high-quality vegetables. 
Contractual arrangements
There were no contractual arrangements in traditional 
value chains. However, during dry seasons, some middle-
men entered into oral contractual agreements with farmers 
whereby they paid for unharvested vegetables. Contract 
values were estimated based on prevailing market prices 
and projected yield estimates. In such arrangements, mid-
dlemen assume all risks and costs related to harvesting and 
marketing. 
The coordinated value chains contracts were based on 
oral informal arrangements. Supermarket managers would 
call farmer group leaders a day or two in advance to make 
specific orders. Such oral orders were not scheduled and 
only specified prices, vegetable types, quantities required, 
and time of delivery. Orders were irregular and unpredict-
able, making it difficult for farmers to schedule harvesting 
activities. The orders did not specify payments dates. In spite 
of all these challenges, farmers considered supermarkets as 
better options since prices were predictable and relatively 
stable throughout the year. The arrangements between super-
markets and farmer groups were more inhibiting to achiev-
ing smallholder integration. For instance, supermarkets paid 
farmers on quantities sold and not quantities delivered. Sup-
pliers were informed with every order to replace unsold veg-
etables by supermarkets. On average, suppliers replaced 4-7 
bunches with every order placed. 
Information flow
Many farmers in rural areas received market information 
through middlemen. The traditional chains were character-
ised by asymmetrical access to information on the part of 
actors. The study found that market information originated 
from wholesales to other actors. Wholesalers were the gate-
keepers of information flow in the chain. They knew of mar-
ket demand because of forward linkages with retailers and 
supply availability due to their backward linkages with mid-
dlemen and farmers. For example, every morning, wholesal-
ers contacted middlemen to inform them of prices offered, 
quantities and vegetable types required. On the contrary, 
middlemen did not share such information with farmers but, 
instead, used it for negotiating prices. Similarly, downstream 
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information flow from wholesalers to the retailer was weak. 
Retailers did not have prior knowledge on prices and vegeta-
ble type availability until they met with wholesalers. It was 
observed that some urban retailers passed price information 
to consumers through small boards placed on the displayed 
vegetables. In the coordinated chains, however, supermarket 
managers passed market information directly through group 
leaders. Such information included aspects such as vegeta-
ble types required, quantities and prices offered. Additional 
information related to payments due and required replace-
ments for unsold quantities.
Product flow
Along the traditional value chains, vegetable flows 
started from farmers, who, after harvesting, transported 
them to the middlemen at collection centres or local trad-
ing centres where the middlemen assembled, packaged and 
transported them to wholesalers and retail traders. Wholesal-
ers repacked and sold to retail traders based on quantities 
demanded. Retailers further re-bunched the vegetables into 
smaller units and sold directly to consumers. 
Supermarkets procured their vegetable supplies directly 
from farmer groups. Group members assembled their vege-
tables at on point where they were sorted and selected. Good 
quality vegetables were sent to the supermarket, while the 
rest were sold to buyers in the traditional markets. Super-
markets also bought vegetables from intermediaries who 
sourced the vegetables from diverse sellers. Middlemen 
were preferred by supermarkets because smallholder farmers 
did not have the capacity to supply the consistent volumes 
that they required throughout the year.
The results further revealed that many farmers sell veg-
etables through channels in the traditional value chains, only 
farmers from peri-urban areas sold vegetables to supermar-
kets in Nairobi. The governance parameters discussed above 
indicate that wholesalers and supermarkets were the lead 
actors in traditional and coordinated value chains respec-
tively. The AIV value chains exhibit multiple and, some-
times, alternating governance arrangements within some 
market channels. Nonetheless, the dominant governance 
arrangements in the traditional value chain is characterized 
by “arm’s length” spot market systems, where actors engaged 
at random to discover prices with every transaction. The 
information and knowledge of vegetable quality standards 
was minimally based on physical attributes such as fresh-
ness, greenness, and tender leaves. It was also characterized 
by low trust levels between farmers and traders, with farmers 
blaming traders for offering low prices, on the one hand, and 
traders blaming farmers for supplying inconsistent quanti-
ties, on the other. In the midstream, however, the relation-
ship between middlemen and wholesalers was characterised 
by relational governance arrangements as shown in Figure 
4. Middlemen and wholesalers had high levels trust due to 
long-term trade relationships to the extent that transactions 
no longer involved face-to-face contact.
In the coordinated value chains, the relationship between 
farmers and supermarkets was by modular governance, 
where vertical linkages were limited to suppliers meeting 
procurement conditions only. This finding was consistent 
with other studies on domestic value chains in developing 
countries (Trienekens, 2011). Farmers had minimal bargain-
ing power and were forced to sell vegetables at the price 
offered by supermarkets. 
Rural farmer
Per-urban 
farmers and 
farmers 
groups
Middlemen
Local 
retail traders
Urban 
retail traders
Supermarkets
Middlemen
Wholesalers
Spot 
market
Modular
Modular
Relational
Unidirectional 
information flow
Flow of vegetables
Mutual 
information flow
Figure 4: Governance structure of AIV value chains.
Source: Own composition
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There were two alternating and sometimes overlapping 
modes of governance in the traditional value chains (Figure 
4). The grey dotted arrows show the unidirectional informa-
tion flow from middlemen and wholesales to farmers and 
retail traders signifying spot market governance arrange-
ments. The thick grey arrows show mutual market informa-
tion sharing between actors, which demonstrate either rela-
tional governance arrangements between wholesalers and 
middlemen or modular governance arrangements between 
supermarkets and their suppliers (farmer groups or middle-
men). The multiple nature of governance arrangements in the 
traditional value chains was such that from farmers to mid-
dlemen, the transactions were spot market, then they turn to 
relational between middlemen and wholesalers and, finally 
to spot market arrangements between wholesalers and retail-
ers or other middlemen and supermarkets. The green arrows 
are indicative of the flow of vegetables between actors.
Discussion and conclusions
Our discussion of chain governance has been predi-
cated on the three dimensions suggested by (Gereffi and 
Lee, 2012); the results have then been interpreted through 
the lens of the global value chains theory. The findings have 
shown that intermediaries govern the AIV value chains and 
as such, determine the accessibility of these vegetables to 
non-producing households through distribution and food 
costs. In the traditional value chains, wholesalers determine 
quantities and prices, while in the coordinated chain, super-
markets set parameters such as quality and quantity require-
ments as well as prices. The ensuing sections interpret the 
dynamics of AIV value chains based on the dimensions of 
governance.
As to complexity of the transactions, in the traditional 
value chains, there are no quality specifications and the main 
information sharing between actors revolves around simple 
daily prices. Vegetables sold in the traditional market out-
lets were found not to be graded and therefore farmers did 
not require additional information, other than knowing the 
prevailing market prices, in order to supply the markets. 
Execution of every transaction was purely based on the abil-
ity of the negotiating partners. Equally, consumers in the 
traditional chains preferred higher quality vegetables but as 
Gido et al. (2017) observed, quantities per unit price greatly 
influence consumer choice for retail outlets. As explained in 
the previous section, middlemen do not share adequate and 
reliable market information with farmers. Poor transmission 
of product quality information to farmers may explain why 
there was value addition in the chains.
In the coordinated chains, retailing of indigenous vegeta-
bles is a niche for supermarkets. Consequently, the product 
and process specifications required were not relatively sim-
ple to transfer. Suppliers were to comply with quantity and 
vegetable type specifications that varied with every order. 
In addition to high-quality requirements, suppliers were to 
deliver vegetables at specific locations at scheduled time. 
Such specifications were communicated directly to con-
tracted suppliers as and when supermarkets required veg-
etables. These consistency requirements make transactions 
more complex especially because of the seasonal nature of 
vegetable production.
As for the ability to codify transaction information, qual-
ity standards related information and knowledge on indig-
enous vegetables in both traditional and coordinated value 
chains were not codified. Farmers entirely determined pro-
duction process and assumed all risks. There were neither 
private standards nor certification of indigenous vegetables 
produced in Kenya. Our results suggested that compliance 
with the physical quality requirements as set by supermar-
kets were not in themselves too complex for farmers so as 
to impede access to coordinated chains. Rather, it was the 
execution of the incomplete contracts on the part of super-
markets that made it costly for farmers (Williamson, 1985). 
The contracts were incomplete and shifted the risk burdens 
to farmers. In essence, these contractual arrangements were 
ridden with uncertainties incapable of providing incentives 
for upgrading. Such uncertainties on payments and verifica-
tion of sales were likely to affect trust between farmers and 
supermarkets (Singh, 2002). Contrary to this study’s expec-
tation, the contractual arrangements between some interme-
diaries and farmers during dry seasons were comparatively 
better. In such arrangements risks and marketing costs bur-
den were transferred to middlemen.
As to supplier capabilities, farmers in the rural areas 
engaged in less intensive production characterised by low 
application of productivity-enhancing technologies such as 
improved seeds and irrigation practices. Production deci-
sions were not based on market demands. In addition, farm-
ers were not able to supply adequate vegetables throughout 
the year. Comparatively, more farmers in the peri-urban 
areas used improved seeds, fertiliser and irrigation. These 
technology adoptions were indicative of a more commercial-
ized approach to production, albeit with shortcomings. On 
average, farmers produced two types of AIVs yet there was 
a huge demand for other varieties (Gido et al., 2017). The 
demand for more varieties provided opportunities for prod-
uct upgrading but it appeared that farmers did not have ade-
quate information regarding market demands for other AIV 
types. This partly explained why supermarkets preferred 
the loose oral contractual arrangements with farmers. The 
inability to consistently supply adequate vegetables to the 
market affects food availability in the markets and regular 
income to smallholders.
On the whole, the value chain for African indigenous 
vegetables in Kenya was replete with weak producer col-
lective action towards marketing, incapable of fostering 
beneficial vertical coordination with buyers. Differentials in 
the structure and dynamics of the chain, such as the rural 
and peri-urban perspectives, provided diversity of marketing 
outlets within the same value chains. Interestingly, participa-
tion in the coordinated value chains provided greater income 
security due to low price volatility. However, such stable 
prices were not attractive compared to traditional market 
channels during dry seasons.
This study contends that contractual arrangements in the 
modern value chains for AIV were not precipitating verti-
cal integration. The governance arrangements in the AIV 
value chains was beset with low trust between farmers and 
downstream actors which negatively impacted on year round 
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